The Immutability of God, Part III - God's Creation and Providence

In this post, I will discuss the immutability of God as it applies to His works of creation and providence, on the basis of the framework set forth in the previous post.

The "Problem"

As I stated in the first post of this series, God's actions in general seem to militate against His immutability. After all, if God is doing X at time t (such as justifying a sinner named Bob) and doing Y at time t+n (such as justifying a sinner named Tom), it would certainly seem like a change in God. After all, if a person's current course of action is attributable to a person, then changing one's course of action would be a change in an attribute of the person, and thus a change in the person.

I have titled this discussion under the dual heads of creation and providence, for the simple reasons that:

1) God is the ultimate source of all that exists aside from Himself.
2) If God is doing something with respect to something aside from Himself, He is either a) creating something new, or b) modifying something already made.
3) Creation can be defined as bringing a new object into existence through direct agency.
4) Providence can be defined as modifying the attributes and properties of existing objects either immediately (that is, supernaturally), or mediately (that is, through secondary causes).

However, both creation and providence are acts of God, so thus they can be discussed under the general principle of divine agency. Is divine agency compatible with divine immutability? That is the question to be answered.

The Solution

Given the framework of the previous post, a solution is easily found if one considers that God is an active, immutable being. That is, that if one were to examine God's individual description of Himself (converted to the form discussed in that framework), that one would find conditional descriptive statements. Inasmuch as God's action is consistent with these principles across time, then God is both active and immutable. However, if God were to be inconsistent with any one (or some combination of) these principles, then God would not be immutable. Once again, the mind interpreting this individual description of God is God's own mind, and we have that mind (1 Cor. 2:16) inasmuch as He has revealed it to us in His Word (1 Cor. 2:13). As God is infinite, we do not possess God's comprehensive description of Himself, but we do have some statements that allow us to understand at least a part of this description.

The solution is as follows:

1) God has decreed from eternity all that shall come to pass
2) God is a being who is faithful to bring His decree to pass, as He has decreed it
3) God knows Himself as He is.
4) Therefore, God knows Himself as a being who is faithful to bring His decreed to pass, as He has decreed it
5) Bringing His decree to pass entails divine agency, specifically creation and providence
6) Therefore, God knows Himself as a being who is faithful to bring His decree to pass, by divine agency, generally creation and providence
7) God's knowledge of Himself grounds His complete individual description
8) Divine agency entails conditional descriptive statements in God's individual description
9) Therefore, God knows Himself as an active agent
10) All of God's actions are subsumed under the fulfillment of His decree
11) Therefore, God's individual description remains the same, for all moments in time corresponding to His actions
12) Therefore, God is immutable in divine agency

Scriptural Analysis

God's creative work is explicitly affirmed in Gen. 1-2, as well as Job 38, and His providential work is affirmed in Ps. 104, as well as Heb. 1:3 and Col. 1:17. God's active agency is explicitly affirmed in Jn. 5:19-20.

Where does the solution come from, then? The key to the whole issue is the doctrine of God's eternal decree. The Westminster Confession of Faith says it best: "God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass" (III.1). Two particularly pertinent verses in this regard are Is 46:9-10 and Eph. 1:11. These read as follows:

Is. 46:9-10: "I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose"

Eph. 1:11: "In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will"

We could probably also throw in Ps. 115:3: "Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases," though that verse speaks more of God's unconstrained freedom to act according to His good pleasure, rather than His comprehensive decree of all that is to be.

These verses teach that God has explicitly declared the course of history from eternity past, and that He will not fail to bring it to be as He has declared it will be. The Isaiah passage clearly states that God has declared the end from the beginning. The verses thates that God accomplishes His purpose, and counsel. His purpose and counsel subsumes the declaration of the end from the beginning. Thus, it also subsumes the declaration of the beginning. Thus, if God accomplishes His purpose and counsel, then He must have accomplished what He declared, and thus He must have accomplished the beginning. Therefore, this counsel is from the beginning. Before time is eternity past. If the beginning of time is the beginning, then God's declaration of the end from the beginning is from eternity past. The verse also states that God has determined the end from the beginning, which implies a distinction between the two, and by generalization, everything in between. In this verse, the end from the beginning can refer to either the end of everything and the beginning of everything, or the end from the beginning in general. If the former, it is comprehensive of all history. If the latter, it subsumes all intervals of existence (i.e. for everything that has a beginning and an end, God has declared its beginning and end and everything in between), and if so, the the interval of the history of the world is also subsumed. Either way, then, the whole of history has been declared from eternity by God, and He will bring it to pass. As a final matter, it might be objected that the "end" cannot apply to the whole of history, since time will go on forever in eternity (e.g. Rev. 20:10). However, if the phrase "end from the beginning" is taken in a general sense, then the whole of the history of everything is meant - if it has a history, God has declared it (such as the rise and fall of civilizations, more to the context of the verse). There is no reason why the "end" of history cannot be figurative in this case, an end "at the limit," so to speak - a limit which is never reached, (that is - that if history were to have an end, everything from its beginning to its end would be declared; as it is, t = ∞ is the end of history, but this can never be reached by a finite succession of moments; yet all moments from t = 0 (inclusive) to t = ∞ (exclusive) have been declared - thus the end from the beginning).

Eph. 1:11 also teaches something similar. In this context, it is not talking so much about the rise and fall of nations, but the salvation of individuals. In this context, we have been individually predestined to salvation (subsumed in the idea of "obtaining an inheritance"), and this predestination is according to God's purpose. And God's purpose is significant, because God works everything out according to the counsel of His will. But what is the counsel of His will? Is it simply looking down the corridors of time, and seeing what He (somehow) foreknows what He will do? The Arminian may say something like this, but such an idea is logically incoherent, and unsupported by the text. The text states that God works according to the counsel of His will, not the counsel of His foreknowledge. The will of God is determinative, and expressed in His decree. God is faithful to His decree, bringing to pass all that He has determined to accomplish.

The verses just discussed give us points (1), (2), and (10) of the solution argument given above. (1) and (2) are obvious from the preceding discussion. (10) also follows, for if God works all things according to the counsel of His will, then there is nothing that He does not work according to the counsel of His will. Furthermore, if God has declared the end from the beginning and thus everything that is to be, then it is His purpose that those things come to pass (otherwise, if they were not His purpose, He would not have declared them). Yet, He will accomplish all of His purpose. Therefore, (10) follows.

Only one more point needs to be proven from Scripture, and that is point (3). If God is omniscient, then He knows Himself as He is. Furthermore, 1 Cor. 2:10-11 teach that God knows Himself comprehensively. Thus, (3) follows.

Logical Synthesis

From Scripture, we have points (1), (2), (3), and (10) in the solution argument above. Point (4) follows from points (1)-(3). Point (5) was argued in the section entitled "The 'Problem'". Point (6) follows from points (4) and (5). Point (7) follows from the omniscience and comprehensive self-knowledge of God. If God knows Himself as He is, then He knows what conjunction of descriptive statements fully describes Himself. Point (9) follows from points (3) and (8). Point (12) follows from point (11), and definition of immutability given in the previous post. Points (8) and (11) will now be demonstrated to complete the argument.

(8): Divine agency entails conditional descriptive statements in God's individual description

1) God's decree entails a knowledge of the complete state of the world at every point in time for the whole history of the world (from point (1))
2) God knows what He must do to bring every such state to pass at each such moment in time (from point (3) - God grounds all things possible, so if something must be done, He has the ability to do it, and as He has this ability, He knows in Himself what this ability is)
3) Point (10) can be formally represented as follows:
(Time t obtains) -> (Will do what is required to bring about the state of the world at time t + 1, according to the decree). Let this formalism be called the action principle of decree fulfillment.

Thus, it is evident how (8) follows from the other points and the framework of the previous post. It should be noted that the formalism in point (3) pertains to the personality, not the essence of God. God could have chosen not to create anything, though He were capable of doing it. The fact that He has chosen to create speaks to a particular attribute of His personality.

(11): Therefore, God's individual description remains the same, for all moments in time corresponding to His actions

The action principle of decree fulfillment is sufficient to explain all of God's action (at a proximate level - there still remains the question of why God decreed those things in the first place - a question to which the answer has not been revealed in most cases (cf. Dt. 29:29)). Thus, there is no reason why this element of the individual description should fail to evaluate to True corresponding to any point in time, and there are no statements in Scripture that would lead one to think so. Given these two considerations, we are justified in concluding that God's nature and personality is indeed consistent throughout all eternity, and thus we have point (11).

Therefore, the conclusion (point (12)) follows.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that, at a superficial level, it might seem as if God's action in creation and providence contradicts His immutability, upon deeper examination, this need not be the case. The doctrine of God's decree and the doctrine of His comprehensive self-knowledge, combined with the doctrine that God's mind grounds objective reality, allows one to conclude that God indeed knows Himself as One who, through action, stays true to who He is - one who fulfills and brings to pass all that He has decreed to bring to pass. Thus, God is both working (Jn. 5:19-20) and the immutable One, who does not change (Mal. 3:6), and in this there is no contradiction.

As a side note, there is in this doctrine a great deal of comfort. Because in God there is no variableness, or shadow of turning (Jas. 1:17), we can be confident in God's goodness towards us. The goodness and mercy that He has lavished upon us because of Christ, He will continue to lavish upon us, for Christ's sake (Rom. 8:32). And in acting to bring about His decree, He is being consistent with His nature - He is doing what He has eternally purposed to do, and what He has in His Word promised to us that He will do. He will bring about our sanctification and glorification, and ultimately an eternity of indescribably wonderful fellowship with Him. Because God has established His eternal purpose, because He has made His promises, and because He does not change from who He is (which is what He knows Himself to be), we can have confidence, and we can have hope, and thus no one who trusts in Him will be put to shame (Rom. 10:11). Let us then praise Him for His sovereignty, for His decree, and for His immutability, and with Paul say "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid? For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen." (Rom. 11:33-36).

Soli Deo Gloria!

The Immutability of God, Part II - Definitions

In this post, I will provide definitions of identity, change, and immutability that I believe are consistent with Scripture's use of such terms, and that comport with a natural understanding of them.

Interpreting Objects

The world is comprised of objects.

An object is an entity that exists.

Objects are interpreted by minds.

A mind that interprets an object is called an interpreter.

A mind's interpretation of an object is the process of assigning to it some number of attributes and properties.

I define a property as a function that maps an object to a real-valued quantity in some metric space.

I define an attribute as a logical predicate (or possibly its negation) that is true of a given object.

Attributes and Properties

Attributes and properties may be either intrinsic or extrinsic.

Intrinsic attributes and properties concern the object as it is in itself. Examples include the size and shape of a physical object.

Extrinsic attributes and properties concern the object as it relates to other objects in the world. Examples include the position and velocity of a physical object.

The state of an object is the complete set of its attribute and property values.

The world has some number of temporal timesteps, across which objects are interpreted to have different states. For example, a moving physical object is interpreted to have a different position at different timesteps.

Extrinsic attributes and properties of objects can be considered as attributes and properties of a higher-level abstract object, called the world, which contains those objects. Thus, extrinsic attributes and properties are not fundamental to the identity of an object. From this point onward, attributes, properties, and terms defined in terms of them, will refer to terms that are intrinsic, not extrinsic.

Definitions and Descriptions

A descriptive statement is a logical expression, comprised of some combination of attributes and properties.

A description of an object is some conjunction of descriptive statements, applied to a specific object.

An object matches a description if the description evaluates to True, when applied to the state of an object.

A complete essential description is a description, in terms of intrinsic attributes and properties, which contains all necessary descriptive statements to fully describe the essence of an object. The essence of an object is that which makes the object what it is, as opposed to something else.

A class of objects is a set of objects whose complete essential descriptions are identical (to some degree).

Such classes can be hierarchical. For instance the class of objects contains the class of wheeled objects, which contains the class of automobiles, which contains the class of cars, which contains the class of sedans, etc. Generally, the more descriptive statements that are included in a description, the more specific the class becomes, and the fewer objects it contains.

Every object belongs to an object class.

Objects which are members of a class are called individuals within that class.

A complete individual description is a description, in terms of intrinsic attributes and properties, which contains all necessary descriptive statements to fully describe an individual.

Since the members of object classes are generally more specific than the object class itself, the complete essential description of an object class can be considered a definition of that class. An object falls within an object class if it matches the definition of that class

Identity

Generally, we refer to objects by the most specific class they are members of. For instance, though human beings can be considered as members of the higher-level classes of mammals and rational beings, the class of human beings is the lowest-level class that encompasses all humans (by definition). However, each individual can be considered the member of its own object class, called the individual object class.

The identity of an individual is the object class definition of its individual object class.

A pertinent philosophical question is whether or not the identity of an individual is more general than its complete individual description. The Bible would seem to suggest that this is the case, as the identities of individuals do not change, even though their spiritual state changes. The same individual that is born is the same individual that sins, is the same individual that is redeemed, is the same individual that is sanctified, is the same individual that is one day glorified and spends eternity with God. Though such an individual changes over this process (e.g. sanctification is one long process of change, and regeneration is a fundamental change), the identity of the individual does not change (else, God would save someone else than who He predestined to save, and salvation would be meaningless, because it is that person that is foreknown from eternity - Rom. 8:29). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the identity of an object is at least as general as the complete individual description, though perhaps more general, as a general rule.

Inert and Active Objects

Certain intrinsic property and/or attribute values may be defined with respect to conditions obtaining in the outside world. Such statements condition the values of certain attributes and/or properties upon other factors, and are thus called conditional descriptive statements.

Conditional descriptive statements concerning attributes take one of the two general forms:

C(w) -> A(x)
C(w) -> ~A(x)

where C is the condition, w is the world, and A is the attribute in question. The '->' symbol denotes logical implication, and '~' denotes logical negation.

Conditional descriptive statements concerning properties take the general form:

C(w) -> R(P(x),I)

where P(x) is the property in question, R is a set membership relation, and I is some set of values in the range of P(x).

An inert object is an object whose complete individual description contains no conditional descriptive statements. Such an object can never change state without its individual description changing. Since such an object is interpreted to not change state without itself changing, it is called an inert object.

A rock is a good example of an inert object.

An active object is an object whose complete individual description contains at least one conditional descriptive statement. Such an object can change state, in some circumstances, without its individual description changing. Since such an object is interpreted to not change even though its state changes in some circumstances, it is called an active object.

An example of an active object is the Old Faithful geyser. This geyser erupts at (roughly) periodic intervals. Geysers in general might be defined as a geological device which expells steam though a hole in the surface of the earth. However, the Old Faithful geyser, as an individual, is defined in terms of its regularity of eruption. Without the regularity, the geyser is simply another geyser in Yellowstone. With the regularity, it is Old Faithful. Even though the geyser changes state (from erupting to not erupting), it is not said to change, in its individual description. Indeed, if it were change its eruption frequency (as it has in past years), we would say that as an individual, it has changed. However, as long as it keeps to its regular eruption cycle, we would say that it has not changed. If it loses its regularity altogether, then we would say that it has lost its individual identity, since the periodicity of eruption is necessary for the Old Faithful identity.

As a more general example, if attribute A(x) is true of object x in a periodic fashion, such that it is true every T timesteps for a duration of d timesteps, the subset of such an object's complete individual description would be as follows:

(0 ≤ (t mod T) ≤ d) -> A(x)
((t mod T) > d) -> ~A(x)

In being consistent with the above general forms, ((t mod T) {<,>} d) represents a condition of the world, where t is the timestep.

Is such a notion of an active object valid? As we have seen, such a notion is fundamental to our interpretation of many real-world objects. Such a notion is also consistent with Scripture. In many places, God is said to be active, or working (e.g. Jn. 5:19-20). Yet, God also says that He does not change (Mal. 3:6). If one defines God's performance of various actions as attributes, and the timesteps corresponding to their performance as the conditions, and if one asserts that these are a part of God's individual description, then such an approach makes sense of these verses, and is consistent with them. Lest one accuse me of restricting God in some sense, I would only point out that God knows (having determined) His own works from eternity past, and thus, if He knows Himself as active, He knows Himself as active in specific ways corresponding to specific moments in time. Such self-knowledge is consistent with the idea of an individual description.

Change and Immutability

An object is said to change, with respect to an interpreter, if for two different moments in time, t1 and t2 (t1 ~= t2, and presumably t1 < t2), the state of an object at time t2 does not match the description of an object assigned by the interpreter at time t1.

An object is changeless if it has not been oberved to change. It is possible that a changeless object can possibly change.

An object is immutable if it is not possible for it to change.

As a result, it follows that a change in state does not imply a change in description, though a change in description implies a change in state. Thus, an active object can change state without itself being said to change. This corresponds to a difference between the state of the object, as an entity in the world, and the idea of an object, in the mind of an interpreter. If an interpreter defines an object as active in a certain way, then such an object does not change in the mind of the interpreter if it changes in that way. Indeed, for it not to change in that way would be a change, for the interpreter. What God thinks objectively determines objective reality, and thus His idea of an object is truly and most objectively what that object is. Thus, if God thinks of some objects as having conditional descriptive statements, then active immutable objects are indeed possible, and if God thinks of Himself as both active and immutable, then He is, by definition. As an explanation, we can then demonstrate how His revealed individual self-definition is consistent with the idea of an active immutable object as set forth here.

As the immutability of God is the main subject of this discussion, the interpreter in question is God Himself. What God thinks objectively determines objective reality, and thus His definitions of objects (including Himself) are the objective standard of what those objects are. A partial amount of God's individual description of Himself is found in Scripture. Thus, if one is to disprove the immutability of God, one must show how, at some point, God's individual description has changed from what He has described Himself as. The easiest (and probably only) way of doing this is to show a contradiction in the items comprising the individual description found in Scripture - presumably those revealed at different times. Short of this, if my definition here is consistent with Scripture, and no such contradictions as just described can be found, then the critic has no grounds for denying the immutability of God, simply because God is active, has created the world, etc.

Being and Personhood

A being is (here colloquially) defined as an object with personhood.

Personhood denotes the quality of consciousness, having the faculties of belief, desire, and emotion.

A personality is a set of rules that defines the operations of the faculties of belief, desire, and emotion in every possible situation. Thus, a personality entails a set of conditional descriptive statements.

A being can be said to change it its personality changes. For example, consider a man who is friendly and gregarious. His friends and relatives would know him as such (and hence, his friendliness would be a part of his individual description to them). However, if such a man were to later become melancholy and reclusive, we would certainly say that he had changed. He would still be human (he would still match the object class definition for the class of human beings), though he would not have the same personality that he had previously. However, if such a man were later found to be bipolar, oscillating between states of happiness and melancholy, one would say that he had not changed (as in the former sense), when going from one to the other - merely that his outward disposition is consistent with his bipolarity. Thus, we see that personality is a component of the description of an individual, and as in active non-personal objects, conditionality within a personality implies no change in the person, as long as his conditional personality remains consistent across time.

The complete individual description of a being can be divided into the complete essential description describing the essence of the being, and the complete personal description, which completely specifies the being's personality.

Summary

This post provides a framework for understanding notions of identity, change, and immutability, which is consistent with Scripture as well as a natural usage of the terms. In the next posts of this series, I intend to apply this framework specifically to the Bible's statements of God's immutability, demonstrating the consistency thereof given this framework.

The Immutability of God, Part I - Introduction and Issues

Before continuing with the evilbible.com posts, I feel that it is pertinent to discuss the immutability of God. In fact, this issue has direct relevance to some issues to be discussed there. There are many verses in Scripture which state that God does not change. James states that God is "the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (Jas. 1:17). In Malachi, God declares that "I am the Lord, I change not" (Mal. 3:6). In speaking to Moses in the wilderness, God declared that "I AM WHO I AM" (Ex. 3:14). This last verse gets to the heart of the matter. God is, by definition, who He is. If He were to be anything other than what He is, then He would cease to be God. Thus, God does not change. Certainly, this is true of the divine attributes, such as God's omniscience, omnipotence, mercy, justice, etc. However, in many places, God is said to be active. Jesus said: "whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise. For the Father loves the Son and shows him all that he himself is doing" (Jn. 5:19-20). These words seem to indicate a continual action in God - otherwise, God could not be said to "be working" - a phrase which connotes continuous, ongoing activity. Is this not a change in God? After all, if God is doing one thing at one time, and something else at another time, doesn't this mean that God is changing, since what He is doing is different in both of those states?

Perhaps we could also look at creation. For eternity past, there was nothing, then God acted to speak the world into existence. This seems to imply a change in God, does it not? After all, God was seemingly perfectly content with Himself for an eternity, and then for some reason decided to act. There would seem to be a change wrought in God somewhere. Or what about the various states of Christ? After all, the Son, the second Person of the Trinity was at one point pre-incarnate in heaven (after all, one cannot be incarnate if no flesh has yet been created), at one point incarnate in an unglorified human body on earth, at one point incarnate, though His body was dead, at another point incarnate in a glorified human body on earth (pre-ascension), and then finally incarnate in a glorified human body in heaven (post-ascension). Certainly, this would seem to be seem to be a change in God, right? After all, the second Person of the Trinity goes through at least 5 different distinct states with respect to His humanity. That certainly seems like a change.

What about all those places where God is said to repent? For instance, there is Genesis, where prior to the flood, it is said that "the LORD was sorry that He had made man on the earth, and He was grieved in His heart" (Gen. 6:6). Or what about Exodus, where God, after speaking to Moses about destroying the Israelites, "changed His mind about the harm which He said He would do to His people" (Ex. 32:14). Or there's the Ninevites, about which it is said that "when God saw their deeds, that they turned from their wicked way, then God relented concerning the calamity which He had declared He would bring upon them. And He did not do it" (Jonah 3:10). What are we to make of such statements? After all, it does seem that God was intent upon doing something at one point, and then at another point, was not intent upon doing that. That certainly seems like a change of mind, which is something the Bible says that God does not do, for "the Glory of Israel will not lie or change His mind; for He is not a man that He should change His mind" (1 Sam. 15:29).

What are we to make of all of this? I could be irrational, and simply say that the Bible says two seemingly-contradictory things - things that are contradictions for us, and not for God. Thus, I would urge you to accept both sides, and simply live with the tension. After all, if you try to resolve the tension, you end up making a worse theological error somewhere (as some are fond of saying). But, I would rather give up blogging altogether than to continue if such foolish statements were my last recourse to answering these questions. After all, if two verses appear to contradict each other, the interpreter has no way of knowing whether either or both of his interpretations are correct. So much for simply accepting the tension! Despite the cop-outs that many Christians sadly resort to in trying to answer these questions, there is indeed a rational, logical, consistent explanation to all of these issues, and in the following posts, I intend to set it forth, as much as God's grace through my feeble faculties allows.

An Arminian Witnessing

I posted a video here a few months ago that depicts a hyper-Calvinist attempting to witness. There is another humorous video on Youtube that depicts an Arminian trying to witness. Now, this video probably doesn't speak for all Arminians, but I can testify (as a former Arminian myself) that I would have had no scruples against witnessing in this manner once upon a time. The video humorously exposes three doctrinal weakness: 1) an anthropocentric motivation for seeking salvation in Christ, 2) the false doctrine of universal atonement, and 3) the false notion that saving faith consists in saying the sinner's prayer. Now, in the interest of accuracy, it should be noted that only the second point is true to Arminianism, per se, in its historical formulation. The first and third points are relatively modern "Evangelical" additions. Nonetheless, as these additions are consistent with the theology of many Arminians, it is no surprise that Arminian-minded evangelism often incorporates them. This video humorously shows why deviating from the logically-consistent theology of Biblical Calvinism leaves one open to all kinds of unanswerable objections from professing unbelievers.

Celibacy and the Sacrament of Marriage

In his commentary on First Corinthians, Gordon Clark notes an interesting dilemma within Roman Catholicism with respect to celibacy and the sacrament of marriage. In commenting upon 7:14, he notes the following:

"Here one may mention a minor peculiarity in Romanism. Marriage is a sacrament, they say; but celibacy is not. Ordination may be, but a young man who refuses to marry is not celebrating a sacrament. Yet, celibacy is superior to married life. Hence, in this case, it is spiritually advantageous to avoid the sacrament" (p. 106).

It does seem quite odd indeed that participating in the sacrament should be less beneficial than participating in the opposite the opposite of the sacrament. But then again, when theology is built upon the traditions of men, dilemmas, inconsistencies, and contradictions are to be expected.

If Mary is the Mother of God...

It is Catholic dogma to say that Mary is the mother of God. If one contends that Mary is the mother of Christ, one is labeled "Nestorian" and thus heretical. This is a bit of an equivocation, for the reason that just because one holds to a view that Nestorius also held (that Mary is the mother of Christ) does not mean that one holds to the Christological position that is called Nestorian (that is, the view that Christ is two persons, not one). There is no logical necessity that holding that Mary is the mother of Christ also means that one holds to a Nestorian Christology. But nonetheless, accusations of this sort abound. On the contrary, saying that Mary is the mother of Christ, rather than the mother of God, does not make one Nestorian, but rather saves one from an absurd logical conclusion.

1. Mary is the mother of God.
2. God is the Trinity.
3. Therefore, Mary is the mother of the Trinity.

This is absurd, but it gets worse.

4. Both the Father and the Holy Spirit subsist within the Trinity.
5. Therefore, Mary is the mother of both the Father and the Holy Spirit.

This is patently absurd. On the other hand, it is accurate (and logical) to say that Mary was the mother of the incarnate second person of the Trinity. That is, to say that Mary is the mother of Christ. Such an assertion maintains the unity of Christ's natures in one person, without the logical absurdities of saying that Mary was the mother of God. Thus, it is logically coherent, and not Nestorian (in the Christological sense).

One might object, and say "But isn't Jesus God? If Jesus is God, and Mary is the mother of Jesus, then Mary is the mother of God." The problem is that the phrase "Jesus is God" is equivocal. Does it simply mean that Jesus is divine (having the essence of deity, homoousion with the Father), or that Jesus exhausts the meaning of the term God, such that Jesus is God and God is Jesus? Generally, the phrase is taken in the first sense, and if so, then it only makes sense to say that Mary is the mother of Christ, not of God. The second sense is simply incorrect, because Jesus and God are not logically identical. God is a trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and thus to identify Jesus as God, in the second sense, is to assert a modalistic view of the Trinity (since Jesus, encompassing the meaning of "God," must also encompass the Father and Holy Spirit, in which case the most logical explanation is that there is only one person who manifests himself in three different ways). Unless one wants to assert modalism, one cannot say that "Jesus is God, Mary is the mother of Jesus, therefore Mary is the mother of God."

Addendum (12/22/2009)

Turretinfan has advanced this argument on his blog with a new twist: if Mary is the mother of God, then is not David the father, or ancestor, of God? I know of no one who would make such a claim. The fundamental reason is that the English language (and other languages, as far as I am aware) do not semantically equate FatherOf(David,Y) and FatherOf(David,Y(X)). In the first case, Y is an object; in the second, Y is a predicate. When we say that David is the father of Y, we take Y to be a person (or perhaps an idea or invention, in a figurative sense) - an object, but not a predication of another object. Thus, to say that David is the father of God is to assert FatherOf(David,God) - that is, that David is the father of God in his entirety (Trinity and all), since God is an object in this sense, not a predication. To say "no, no, no, that's not what we mean" is to logically necessitate that this statement have the meaning ∃X FatherOf(David,HasDeity(X)), or ∃X FatherOf(David,X) ∧ HasDeity(X), where X is understood to refer to Jesus. The former is not semantically equivalent to saying that David is the father of God, because the FatherOf predicate, in human language, is defined over objects, not predicates. The latter is equivalent to saying "There exists someone who has deity, of whom David is the Father" or "David is the Father of one who has deity." That is not the same as saying that David is the father of God, because "one who has deity" and "God" are not logically equivalent terms (because "God" encompasses a Trinity - three persons which have deity). To be orthodox, and maintain that David is the father of God, one must assert the former (∃X FatherOf(David,HasDeity(X))). That is why it is strange to say that David is the Father of God, because no one ever talks that way (speaking of fatherhood over a predication). Rather, it seems that if one speaks of one being the father of something, that one is the father of that thing, in and of itself, and thus for David to be the father of God, he must be the father of God as a complete being, and this entails being the father of the Trinity. In the same way, the MotherOf predicate is similarly defined over objects, not predicates. Thus, it should be similarly strange to say(and is to those growing up in (at least some) Protestant households), if not for a theological tradition that has corrupted the use of ordinary language. There is a sense in which one can coherently say that "Jesus is God," but there is no sense in which one can say that Mary is the mother of God, without either violating orthodoxy (a modalistic view of the Trinity), or the dictates of language.

The only way that one can say "Jesus is God" in a sense that is logically coherent with the rest of Christian theology is to give this phrase the meaning HasDeity(Jesus). If Jesus = God (that is, that the terms "Jesus" and "God" are logically equivalent), then Jesus = The Father = The Holy Spirit, and there is no orthodox Trinity. Thus, the phrase "Jesus is God" is a predication, not an assertion that the terms Jesus and God are logically equivalent. Thus, in this statement, "God" is not strictly an object, but represents a predication of deity. To say then, that:

1. Jesus is God
2. Mary is the mother of Jesus
3. Mary is the mother of God

is to either assert a modalistic view of the Trinity in (1), or to violate natural language by making Mary the mother of a predication in (3). To hold to this argument, therefore, is either to hold to a heterodox position, make a linguistically meaningless assertion, or make a linguistically inaccurate/imprecise assertion (following from an invalid, and thus fallacious, argument). There is better, fully precise theological language available which solves these problems, and using it does not necessitate an erroneous Christological position.

James White on Molinism

I found a good video this week on Dr. White's YouTube channel, in which he explains and refutes the errors of Molinism. In my personal experience, I know quite a few people who are Molinists, though they aren't aware that Molinism is the term that describes their belief system. But, the idea that God examines all possible worlds (defined by what "free" creatures would do in certain situations) and then chooses one that maximizes the number of the saved while minimizing the number of the lost, is in essence what Molinism entails. Such a doctrine is repugnant, most specifically because 1) it destroys the personal nature of God's electing love, and 2) it essentially limits God - instead of God being the sovereign Creator and determiner of all things, God becomes a reactor, a search algorithm, who merely reacts to things that are possible (which are determined outside of Him), searching to find the solution that maximizes the expression: #Saved - #Lost. Dr. White remarks that Molinism makes man out to be a robot. So much more does it make God out to be a robot! There is no personality here, but simply a search algorithm in service of a optimization problem. So much for the God of the Bible.

So, without further adieu, here is the aforementioned video: